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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are law professors (listed in Addendum A) who have taught, studied, 
written about, and have expertise in the Constitution, constitutional history, and the 
structure and requisites of American federalism.1  They take no position on the 
wisdom of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), a question on which their views diverge.  Nonetheless, they 
have a profound interest in and expertise on the legal issue this Court is called 
upon to decide—whether the Act is within Congress’s powers.  On that question 
they are of one mind:  The provision is plainly constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the minimum-coverage provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having experienced the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution’s Framers understood that the national government needed authority 
____________________________ 
1 Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5), amici certify that no counsel for any party authored 
this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, and that 
no person other than amici, its members, and its counsel made such a monetary 
contribution.  The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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sufficient “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in 
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”  2 
Records of the Federal Convention 21 (Farrand ed., 1911).  To that end, the 
Constitution granted the national government broad powers—most important here, 
the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, 
§8, cl. 3, and to enact laws “necessary and proper” to the effective exercise of that 
power, id. art. I, §8, cl. 18.   
The federal government has long addressed national economic problems that 
state legislation could not solve or, worse, would exacerbate.  As the Nation’s 
economy has become increasingly integrated, moreover, Congress’s exercise of its 
commerce power has naturally expanded as well.  Today, it is beyond argument 
that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate not merely trade between 
States but also commerce within States that, on the whole, has sufficient interstate 
effects.   
Perhaps for that reason, the plaintiffs here do not challenge, and the district 
court did not dispute, the validity of 99% of the Act’s provisions.   The court thus 
nowhere held that Congress exceeded its powers by enacting provisions that: 
 Prohibit insurers from denying coverage of preexisting condi-
tions.  42 U.S.C §300gg-3(a). 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/12/2011     Page: 14 of 50
 3
 Ban insurers from discriminating or denying eligibility based 
on health status.  Id. §300gg-4(a). 
 Bar insurers from establishing “lifetime limits” or “unreason-
able annual limits” on benefits and claims.  Id. §300gg-
11(a)(1)-(2). 
 Prohibit rescission of insurance contracts.  Id. §300gg-12. 
 Require insurers to provide a simple coverage summary.  Id. 
§300gg-15(b). 
 Require insurers to pay for preventive care.  Id. §300gg-13. 
 Require insurers to cover dependents to age 26.  Id. §300gg-
14(a). 
Any challenge to those provisions would be futile:  The Supreme Court has 
squarely held that Congress’s commerce powers include regulation of insurance 
markets.  See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 
539 (1944). 
Largely ignoring those indisputably constitutional provisions, the district 
court below isolated the minimum-coverage requirement—the so-called “indi-
vidual mandate”—for analysis.  Under that provision, most Americans who 
otherwise lack health insurance must, in effect, pay for healthcare in advance by 
obtaining some minimal level of health coverage, as opposed to seeking to 
purchase healthcare on the spot market (or to obtain healthcare without paying for 
it) later.  See 26 U.S.C. §5000A.  The decisions of millions of Americans to 
purchase health insurance now, or instead take a wait-and-see approach, so 
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profoundly affect interstate healthcare and health-insurance markets that Con-
gress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause should be beyond doubt.   
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, is independently supported 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  A central purpose of the Act is to regulate 
interstate commerce—to impose certain terms on health-insurance contracts sold 
across the country to make them more readily available.  No one disputes that such 
direct regulation of health-insurance markets is within Congress’s commerce 
power.  But many of those efforts would, absent the minimum-coverage require-
ment, be futile or counterproductive.  A system requiring insurers to cover 
preexisting conditions, for example, cannot endure if individuals do not have to 
maintain insurance when they are healthy:  Too many healthy individuals would 
wait to buy insurance until they become sick, assured that coverage cannot then be 
denied.  Insurance markets thus would become dominated by high-cost, high-risk 
purchasers, with fewer healthy insureds to offset the costs.  Premiums would 
skyrocket, and cost pressures would drive insurers from the market altogether.   
Congress therefore recognized that the minimum-coverage requirement is 
“essential” to key portions of its regulation of insurance markets.  42 U.S.C. 
§18091(a)(2)(I).  From McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Necessary and Proper 
Clause has consistently been interpreted to grant Congress broad authority to enact 
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legislation appropriate or beneficial to the exercise of its enumerated powers.  The 
minimum-coverage requirement satisfies even the narrowest interpretations of that 
clause.  It is the keystone that prevents much of the Act’s indisputably valid edifice 
of insurance regulation from collapsing. 
ARGUMENT 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act directly regulates commerce 
by regularizing health-insurance contracts and restricting terms like preexisting-
condition exclusions and discriminatory pricing.  Those regulations, unquestion-
ably within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, would be ineffective absent 
the minimum-coverage requirement.  The Necessary and Proper Clause exists 
precisely to permit such provisions where Congress reasonably deems them 
necessary and appropriate to effectuating its enumerated powers.  The minimum-
coverage requirement, moreover, is a permissible regulation of commerce in its 
own right. 
I. The Commerce Clause Was Designed and Has Been Understood To 
Empower Congress To Address Problems Requiring National Solutions 
Having learned firsthand the disastrous consequences of denying the 
national government authority to address issues of common interest, the founding 
generation drafted a Constitution that empowers Congress to legislate for the 
general interests of the Nation, where the individual States are incompetent to act, 
and where individual state legislation might disrupt national harmony.  The 
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decision below harkens not to the original understanding of the Constitution (or to 
the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting it), but to the Articles of Confederation the 
Constitution replaced.     
A. The Commerce Clause Was Designed To Afford Congress Broad 
Power over National Economic Problems  
The Articles of Confederation had left the new Nation adrift in a motley sea 
of competing and conflicting state laws, its central government unable to maintain 
order.  Washington lamented, “I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, 
without having lodged some where a power which will pervade the whole Union in 
as energetic a manner, as the authority of the State governments extends over the 
several States.”  Washington, Letters and Addresses 287 (Viles ed., 1909).  
Madison observed that the Articles had failed because of “[w]ant of concert in 
matters where common interest requires it.”  1 Letters and Other Writings of James 
Madison 321 (1865).  Without a central government capable of establishing 
uniform commercial regulations, States enacted protectionist restrictions on 
“commercial intercourse with other States,” which in turn “beg[a]t retaliating 
regulations” not merely “expensive and vexatious in themselves” but also 
“destructive of the general harmony.”  Id. 
The absence of a uniform economic policy exacted a heavy toll.  As 
Hamilton observed, often “it would be beneficial to all the States to encourage, or 
suppress[,] a particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to [any] to 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/12/2011     Page: 18 of 50
 7
attempt it without the concurrence of the rest.”  7 The Papers of Alexander Hamil-
ton 78 (Syrett ed., 1962).  The risk of non-cooperation meant “the experiment 
would probably be left untried” by any State “for fear of a want of that concur-
rence.”  Id.; see also Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 
1241, 1258-59 (1997).  That fear was well founded.  For example, when States 
“needed to enact legislation prohibiting British ships from entering American 
harbors” to give the Nation leverage in trade negotiations, Massachusetts passed a 
navigation act restricting foreign vessels’ use of its ports.  LeBoeuf, The Econom-
ics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San 
Diego L. Rev. 555, 595-96 (1994).  But “most states did nothing,” preferring to 
take for themselves the “significant amount of trade” Massachusetts’s law diverted 
from its shores.  Id.  Massachusetts consequently repealed its legislation.  Id.   
Based on those experiences, the Framers profoundly understood “the 
necessity of some general and permanent system, which should at once embrace all 
interests, and, by placing the states upon firm and united ground, enable them 
effectually to assert their commercial rights.”  4 The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 254 (Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1836) (statement of Charles Pinckney).  The Constitutional Convention resolved 
that Congress should have power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests 
of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in 
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which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation.”  2 Farrand, supra, at 21; see also 1 id. at 21 (Resolution VI 
of Virginia Plan).  The Committee of Detail expanded that principle into a draft 
Constitution with enumerated powers, including most notably authority to 
“regulate Commerce . . .  among the several States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.   
As James Wilson—a Committee of Detail member and later the first Justice 
appointed to the Supreme Court—explained, all agreed that federal power 
extended to “whatever object of government extends in its operation or effects 
beyond the bounds of a particular state.”  2 Elliot, supra, at 399.  While that 
principle was “sound and satisfactory,” “its application to particular cases would 
be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its application, room must be 
allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle.”  Id.  “In 
order to lessen or remove th[at] difficulty,” Wilson explained, “an enumeration of 
particular instances; in which the application of the principle ought to take place, 
has been attempted with much industry and care.”  Id.  Put another way, “the pur-
pose of enumeration was not to displace the principle but to enact it.”  Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010). 
Scholars of all stripes thus agree that the commerce power is “best under-
stood in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the 
Articles of Confederation.”  Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A 
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General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 165 (2010); see 
Calabresi & Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Fed-
eralism, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in American 
history for empowering our national government has been the need to overcome 
collective action problems.”); Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in 
the Making of the Constitution 178 (1996); Regan, How to Think About the 
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 
Mich. L. Rev. 554, 555 (1995); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More 
States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335 (1934). 
B. Longstanding Practice and Precedent Confirm Congress’s Broad 
Regulatory Authority Under the Commerce Clause 
Consistent with that history, the Supreme Court has long held that the 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to address national economic problems 
where action by the individual States is ineffective or deleterious, or where concer-
ted action is otherwise appropriate.  That power has proved “‘broad enough to 
allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1965, in view of the Nation’s increasingly interdependent economy.   
1. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Mar-
shall echoed the Constitutional Convention’s resolutions to articulate the control-
ling principle.  Upholding Congress’s power to regulate steamboat navigation on 
the Hudson River, he explained that the commerce power extends “to all the 
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external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the 
States generally,” excluding only those concerns “completely within a particular 
State,” and “which do not affect other States.”  Id. at 195. 
While Gibbons established federal authority over the “deep streams which 
penetrate our country in every direction,” 22 U.S. at 195, railways eventually 
overtook rivers as the dominant means of interstate transportation.  But “the 
requirements of the various state statutes were conflicting and difficult for the 
railroads to implement.”  McDonald, 100 Years of Safer Railroads 1, 6-7 (1993).  
“[S]tate governments as well as some segments of the railroad industry began to 
urge Federal legislation to provide a workable set of standards.”  Id. at 7.  When 
railroads nonetheless balked at federal regulation of intrastate rates, the Supreme 
Court rebuffed their challenges.  See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 350 
(1914).  Even if intrastate shipping was not by itself under Congress’s power, 
Congress “unquestionably” could “prevent the intrastate operations of [the 
railroads] from being made a means of injury to” its regulation of interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 351.  In doing so, Congress was entitled to “take all measures 
necessary or appropriate to that end.”  Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
2. The Supreme Court’s path has not been unbroken.  It has at times 
barred Congress from addressing commercial problems the States could not handle 
themselves.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court invalidated a federal 
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prohibition on the interstate movement of goods produced by child labor even 
though state efforts to prohibit child labor were undermined by competition from 
States with laxer standards.  247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918); see also Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-10 (1936). 
But the Court has since recognized that, in our increasingly interdependent 
national economy, those “Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the 
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”  United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
36 (1937).  For example, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court 
repudiated Hammer and held that Congress could regulate production to ensure 
that interstate commerce would not “be made the instrument of [unfair and 
disruptive] competition” among the States “in the distribution of goods produced 
under substandard labor conditions.”  Id. at 115-17; see Balkin, supra, at 32.  
Many decisions of that era rest on similar rationales.  In upholding federal 
unemployment-benefits legislation under Congress’s taxing power, for example, 
the Supreme Court noted the States’ unwillingness to enact similar legislation “lest 
in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a 
position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors.”  
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Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).2  A State’s 
beneficent actions could also unduly drain its coffers, because “[t]he existence of 
. . . a system [of old-age benefits] is a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, 
encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.  Only a power that is 
national can serve the interests of all.”  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 
(1937). 
The Court similarly recognized the profound impact of intrastate activity on 
interstate commerce, reaffirming that federal power extends “to those internal 
concerns which affect the States generally” and excludes only matters “completely 
within a particular State” that “do not affect other States.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 
195.  “Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately con-
sidered,” the Court held, “if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to 
exercise that control.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.   
Then-Solicitor General (later Justice) Stanley Reed thus explained how 
increasingly interconnected markets had led to expanded exercises of federal 
____________________________ 
2 The Court noted that Massachusetts’s unemployment-benefits act by its terms 
would “not become operative unless the federal bill became a law, or unless eleven 
of [21 listed] states should impose on their employers burdens substantially 
equivalent.”  Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 588 n.9. 
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commerce power:  “In a simpler time, when life ordinarily was limited to 
community activities, or at most to the boundaries of a single State, the powers 
granted to the national government were rarely utilized in such manner as to affect 
the daily existence of the citizen.”  Reed, The Constitution and the Problems of 
Today, 47 Proc. Va. St. Bar Ass’n 277, 277 (1936).  But “[w]ith our social and 
economic development, with improvements in transportation and communication, 
with broadening boundaries and increasing population, with industrialization and 
multiplying world contacts, problems believed to require further exercise of 
national powers appeared.”  Id.  Everyone “must recognize the desirability of 
Federal and State legislation of a new type to meet the exigencies of this modern 
world.”  Id. at 300.  That explanation echoed the understanding that had come to 
pervade the Nation.  See, e.g., Rendezvous with Destiny: Addresses and Opinions 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 295 (Hardman ed., 1944) (“The prosperity of the 
farmer does have an effect today on the manufacturer in Pittsburgh.  The prosperity 
of the clothing worker in the City of New York has an effect on the prosperity of 
the farmer in Wisconsin, and so it goes.  We are interdependent—we are tied 
together.”).  The Court likewise came to recognize that, in an integrated economy, 
even small choices—such as a farmer’s “trivial” consumption of homegrown 
wheat—can cumulatively have sufficient repercussions throughout national 
markets to justify federal regulation.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 
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(1942); see Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 160 (state efforts to combat wheat 
overproduction “faced insuperable difficulties” because “holdout” States refused to 
restrict producers).  
3. The Supreme Court has continued to uphold Congress’s power to 
protect, promote, and regulate interstate commerce.  For example, Congress may 
prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, because such discrimination 
restricts interstate travelers’ choices and impedes the free flow of commerce.  See 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964).  And Congress may enact environ-
mental measures that States, deterred by the prospect of disadvantaging in-state 
businesses, might not implement themselves.  See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981).  
As the Nation has grown from 13 to 50 States, the need for national solu-
tions has grown.  Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 143; Balkin, supra, at 12 n.37.  “[A]s 
the number of members of a federation increases, the amount of regulation of 
interstate commerce and the scope of the federal government’s power over 
interstate commerce . . . increase[s] as well.”  Calabresi & Terrell, supra, at 16.  
The exercise of federal commerce power has thus expanded not merely with our 
interconnected economy but also with the need for national solutions to problems 
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that would otherwise be left unaddressed by individual States—a need the Framers 
well understood.   
Far from rejecting that understanding, recent Supreme Court decisions 
emphasizing the limits of Congress’s commerce powers embrace it.  In striking 
down a federal prohibition on gun possession near schools, and federal laws 
addressing violence against women, the Supreme Court has carefully explained 
that those provisions bore only the most “attenuated” connection to anything 
resembling commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000), and 
implicated no barriers to effective individual state action, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Those decisions are thus fully consistent with the broad 
commerce power the Court has recognized for two centuries.  
II. The Act Falls Within the Historical Understanding of Congress’s 
Commerce Powers 
A. The Act Directly Regulates Interstate Commerce 
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s 
regulation of insurance, holding that “the word ‘commerce’ as used in the 
Commerce Clause . . . include[s] a business such as insurance.”  322 U.S. at 539; 
see 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(3).  Health insurance is no exception.  To the contrary, its 
interstate nature is inescapable.  “Health insurance and health care services” now 
constitute over one-sixth of the U.S. economy.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(B).  And 
“[p]rivate health insurance spending . . . pays for medical supplies, drugs, and 
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equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce.”  Id.  “[M]ost health insurance 
is sold by national or regional health insurance companies”; “health insurance is 
sold in interstate commerce”; and “claims payments flow through interstate 
commerce.”  Id.   
There is thus no serious debate that almost all the Act’s provisions 
addressing health-insurance contract terms fall squarely within Congress’s com-
merce power.  Those provisions do not merely address matters that “substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  They 
directly regulate commercial transactions in a nationwide marketplace by 
regularizing the terms on which health insurance is offered.  Regulations governing 
the “practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business” 
affect the “[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all 
the states in which they operate,” the “continuous and indivisible stream of 
intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of 
policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are 
essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.”  South-Eastern 
Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 541.  The Act permissibly “prescrib[es] rules for 
carrying on that intercourse.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190. 
The Act also regulates in an area where the States often cannot.  Today, 
most States allow insurance companies to deny “coverage, charge higher premi-
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ums, and/or refuse to cover” preexisting medical conditions.  Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Coverage Denied 1 (2009).  As a result, many individuals—
including those who most need healthcare—cannot obtain insurance.  Id.  Yet 
pioneering States seeking to compel coverage for preexisting conditions confront a 
grave risk of systemic failure.  Individuals whose health conditions make it 
impossible to obtain coverage in other States will be drawn to States with more 
protective laws.  That, in turn, can drive premiums up.  Healthier individuals may 
flee.  And insurers may abandon the State, leaving residents with fewer choices 
and less competition.  Indeed, after Kentucky enacted reform, all but two insurers 
(one State-run) abandoned the State.  See Kirk, Riding the Bull, 25 J. Health. Pol. 
Pol’y & L. 133 (2000); Balkin, supra, at 46.  States seeking to resolve the problem 
of preexisting conditions thus face overwhelming difficulties if other States do not 
follow suit.  Only a handful of States have attempted to ban preexisting-condition 
exclusions, and only one, Massachusetts, has had anything approaching success.  
See p. 28, infra.   
The Act, moreover, prevents the “interrupt[ion]” of “the harmony of the 
United States” and impediments to interstate commerce that balkanized state 
regulation might cause.  2 Farrand, supra, at 21.  Individuals with preexisting 
medical conditions, for example, cannot pursue new opportunities in States that 
permit insurers to deny them coverage.  Such unnecessary and nationally 
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detrimental barriers to interstate migration and commerce are precisely what 
Congress has taken steps to redress in the past.  See, e.g., Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. I, 110 Stat. 
1936, 1939; id. §195(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1991; cf. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300; 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53. 
B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Falls Within Congress’s 
Commerce Power 
The minimum-coverage requirement regulates commerce.  As the United 
States has explained, Americans have a choice about how to finance their 
healthcare:  They can pay for it in advance by purchasing insurance, or they can 
risk trying to pay for it on an as-needed basis.  Cumulatively, those individual 
choices have an enormous impact on interstate commerce that dwarfs the decision 
to grow wheat for personal consumption at issue in Wickard.  In 2008, for 
example, the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured” totaled $43 
billion.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(F).  “[H]ealth care providers pass on th[at] cost to 
private insurers, which pass on the cost” by charging families higher premiums, 
“by on average over $1,000 a year.”  Id.  Other effects abound:  Doctors “curtail 
unprofitable services and shorten hours of service.”  Pagán & Pauly, Community-
Level Uninsurance and the Unmet Medical Needs of Insured and Uninsured 
Adults, 41 Health Serv. Res. 788, 791 (2006).  And “lower revenue streams . . . 
could even force [providers and hospitals] to relocate or cease” operating 
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altogether.  Id. at 789.  Thus, as with the other, unchallenged provisions of the Act, 
“Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving [healthcare-financing 
decisions by the uninsured] outside federal control would similarly affect price and 
market conditions.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
The district court, however, concluded that “[i]t would be a radical departure 
from existing case law to hold that Congress can regulate inactivity”—i.e., a 
citizen’s choice not to purchase health insurance.  Slip op. at 42.  That conclusion 
has no pedigree in Supreme Court precedent, and harkens to the formalisms the 
Court has long rejected.  As Wickard explained, “recognition of the relevance of 
the economic effects in the application of the Commerce Clause . . . has made the 
mechanical application of legal formulas no longer feasible.”  317 U.S. at 123-24.  
Rather, “interstate commerce itself is a practical conception,” and so “interferences 
with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual 
experience.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-42.  A regulated matter, 
“whatever its nature,” can “be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.  
The purported activity/inactivity distinction also makes little sense.  “Econo-
mists accept . . . that some forms of ‘inactivity’ affect economic health as much as 
activity does.”  Mariner & Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 363 
New Eng. J. Med. 1300, 1301 (2010).  The Supreme Court recognized that basic 
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economic principle in Wickard, holding that Congress could validly “restrict . . . 
the extent . . . to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing [wheat] 
to meet his own needs,” even if it “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy 
what they could provide for themselves.”  317 U.S. at 127, 129 (emphasis added).  
“Far from being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume” billions of 
dollars in uncompensated care, “the costs of which are passed through health care 
institutions to insured Americans.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, Buying Health Care, 
the Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 401, 402 
(2010).   
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, falls on the “activity” side 
of any activity/inactivity divide.  Cf. slip op. at 44-56.  There is virtually no such 
thing as “inactivity” in the healthcare market.  One cannot opt out of illness, 
disability, and death.  The requirement thus regulates present “economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health 
insurance is purchased”—whether to pay for healthcare now by buying insurance 
or to defer payment by attempting to self-insure.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added).  It likewise regulates the inevitable future activity of obtaining 
healthcare, by requiring advance arrangements that ensure an ability to pay for it.  
Congress could certainly enact a statute requiring any individual who obtained 
healthcare without payment in 2010 to purchase insurance for 2011 or pay a 
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penalty.  The requirement here simply does that without waiting for an instance of 
non-payment.3  
In its order granting a conditional stay, the district court invoked the rhetoric 
of personal liberty.  Mar. 3, 2011 Dkt. Entry, at 4-5 n.2.  But the question here is 
not whether “other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process 
Clause”—would preclude the regulation; the question is the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Structural aspects of the 
Constitution often protect individual liberty.  See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  But the Court enforces those 
structural aspects by ensuring that Congress is acting within its enumerated 
powers, not by importing substantive due process concerns into the Commerce 
Clause analysis.  The district court did not frame its analysis in terms of substan-
tive due process, a highly dubious theory that would put healthcare reform beyond 
____________________________ 
3 Congress already directly regulates countless activities that increase the risk of 
requiring healthcare, from car safety, 49 U.S.C. §30101 et seq., to food content, 21 
U.S.C. §301 et seq.  Congress would not be said to regulate “inactivity” if it 
required everyone who chooses to engage in those activities—e.g., driving a car or 
buying certain foods—to obtain insurance, even though that would cover virtually 
every American.  The minimum-coverage requirement achieves the same result 
through less convoluted means. 
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even state authority.4  Yet invalidating the provision would have the same practical 
effect, given most States’ inability to address the problem alone. 
No one disputes that Congress could have chosen not to enact reform but 
rather to tax all Americans and spend those dollars buying insurance for each 
American “in aid of the ‘general welfare.’”  Cf. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-42.  
The minimum-coverage requirement surely is no more damaging to individual 
liberty.  To the contrary, it removes the government as purchaser and allows 
individuals, not bureaucrats, to choose their policies.  Even if a few individuals 
might have been able to self-insure reliably, or to live so remotely as to preclude 
any resort to the healthcare system, Congress is not required “to legislate with 
scientific exactitude.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.  It may, “ ‘[w]hen it is necessary in 
order to prevent an evil[,] . . . make the law embrace more than the precise thing to 
be prevented.’”  Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).  “When Con-
gress decides that the ‘“total incidence”’ of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).  
When uninsured individuals seek healthcare, they in the aggregate impose an enor-
____________________________ 
4 The minimum-coverage requirement no more violates substantive due process 
than far more invasive regulations like compulsory vaccination laws.  See Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2011) 
(statement of Professor Charles Fried), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02% 
20Fried%20Testimony.pdf. 
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mous burden on the healthcare system that “affect[s] price and market conditions” 
of health insurance generally.  Id. at 19; 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(F); see pp. 18-20, 
supra.  As a result, “a ‘rational basis’ exists” for concluding that uninsured indi-
viduals “substantially affect interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
III. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Is Necessary and Proper To 
Effectuate Congress’s Regulation of Health Insurance 
While the district court dismissed the Necessary and Proper Clause as “not 
really” embodying “a separate inquiry,” slip op. at 13 n.7, that clause has sub-
stance.  The Necessary and Proper Clause at the very least allows Congress to 
enact additional provisions that are essential to the effective exercise of its 
enumerated powers.  That is precisely what the minimum-coverage requirement 
does.  There is no dispute that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause 
to prohibit, for example, discrimination and preexisting-condition exclusions.  The 
minimum-coverage provision prevents the adverse selection that would otherwise 
cause those prohibitions to collapse.  If a provision needed to protect Congress’s 
exercise of Commerce Clause authority from self-destruction is not “necessary and 
proper,” it is hard to imagine what is. 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Grants Congress Broad Powers 
To Choose Means That Are Rationally Related to the Implemen-
tation of Its Legitimately Exercised Powers 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution “grants Congress broad authority,” 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
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proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers, U.S. Const. art. I, §8, 
cl. 18.  Congress legitimately exercises that power “when the means chosen, 
although themselves not within the granted power, [a]re nevertheless deemed 
appropriate aids” rationally related “to the accomplishment of some purpose within 
an admitted power of the national government.”  Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.  Because 
the clause “empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated 
powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation,” necessary-and-proper 
legislation in aid of Congress’s commerce power need not itself “regulate 
economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. 
at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
That broad authority reaches back centuries.  In McCulloch, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “a government, entrusted with” enumerated powers, “must 
also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.”  17 U.S. at 408.  
“[N]ecessary,” Chief Justice Marshall explained, does not mean “absolutely 
necessary.”  Id. at 414-15; see also 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States §1243, at 118 (1833); id. §1240, at 116.  “Accordingly, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific 
federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are 
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  The 
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Necessary and Proper Clause sweeps broadly because the Constitution is “intended 
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently [is] to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs.”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415; see id. at 421. 
McCulloch was not written on a blank slate.  Hamilton and Madison had 
sparred over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause as they debated the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.  To Hamilton, the proper focus 
was on “the end to which the measure relates as a mean.”  Legislative and Docu-
mentary History of the Bank of the United States 99 (Clark & Hall eds., 1832).  “If 
the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the 
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular 
provision of the constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass 
of the national authority.”  Id.  Madison took a narrower view, interpreting the 
clause as endowing Congress with power only to provide a “direct and incidental 
means” to attain the object of an enumerated power.  Id. at 42.  In the end, 
Hamilton prevailed:  “The interpretation given by Mr. Hamilton was substantially 
followed by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch . . . .”  The Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. 457, 642 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).  But the minimum-coverage 
provision survives even under Madison’s more limited interpretation. 
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B. The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Comfortably Falls Within 
Congress’s Necessary-and-Proper Authority 
To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute need only 
“constitute[ ] a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitu-
tionally enumerated power.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  The Constitution 
entrusts the choice of means “ ‘primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress.’”  Id. at 
1957.  “ ‘If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the 
end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the 
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained, 
are matters for congressional determination alone.’”  Id. (emphasis added).  The 
minimum-coverage requirement fits comfortably within the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.   
1. There is no dispute that Congress legitimately exercised its Commerce 
Clause authority when it enacted provisions preventing insurers from imposing 
preexisting-condition exclusions, 42 U.S.C. §300gg-3(a), or health-status restric-
tions, id. §300gg-4(a).  See p. 16, supra.  The minimum-coverage requirement is a 
necessary and proper means of effectuating those regulations.  Absent the 
minimum-coverage keystone, those provisions would collapse under the weight of 
a massive adverse-selection problem.  “[I]f there were no requirement,” Congress 
observed, “many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they 
needed care.”  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(I).  Insurance markets would become domi-
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nated by high-cost, high-risk individuals in need of immediate care.  The impact of 
that adverse-selection problem is obvious:  Premiums would skyrocket, defeating 
the very objectives Congress sought to achieve—making insurance more widely 
and readily available to the American public.   
Congress concluded that the appropriate means of preventing that adverse-
selection problem, and protecting the prohibitions on preexisting-condition 
exclusions and similar requirements, was to require all qualified individuals 
(healthy and unhealthy alike) to participate.  42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2)(I).  The 
minimum-coverage requirement, Congress thus found, is “essential to creating 
effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products 
that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can 
be sold.”  Id.   
That “ ‘judgment of Congress,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957, is not merely 
entitled to judicial respect.  It is based on unassailable economics.  Absent a 
mandate, adverse selection drives up premiums.  See Glied et al., Consider It 
Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612, 
1613 (2007).  Indeed, “[f]ive states have tried to undertake reforms . . . without 
enacting an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states 
with the most expensive nongroup health insurance.”  Rosenbaum & Gruber, 
supra, at 403.  In Washington and Kentucky, insurers fled the market.  Kirk, supra, 
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at 139, 152.  By contrast, when Massachusetts coupled its limit on preexisting-
condition exclusions with an individual mandate, it substantially ameliorated the 
adverse-selection problem.  Chandra, et al., The Importance of the Individual 
Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 293, 295 (2011).  
To be necessary and proper, a provision need only “constitute[ ] a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  Here, the minimum-coverage requirement is not 
merely “rationally related” to Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause author-
ity.  It is critical to many of the Act’s provisions.   
2. Rather than addressing whether the minimum-coverage requirement is 
rationally related to Congress’s exercise of its commerce powers, the district court 
held that the requirement could not be sustained under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause because that provision should not allow Congress to legislate beyond an 
enumerated power.  See slip op. at 62-63.  That view cannot be reconciled with the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the clause does allow Congress to “enact laws in 
effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in 
isolation.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see Com-
stock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957-58; Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.  It is also contrary to 
centuries of precedent.  Under McCulloch, a provision need only be “convenient, 
or useful” or “conducive” to Congress’s exercise of an enumerated power, 17 U.S. 
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at 413, 418, a standard the minimum-coverage requirement assuredly meets.  
Indeed, the requirement satisfies any conceivable interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  The requirement easily survives review whether one requires 
“a tangible link to commerce,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment), an “ ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred by the 
Constitution and the law enacted by Congress,” id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment), an “ ‘“obvious, simple, and direct relation”’ to an exercise of Congress’ 
enumerated powers,” id. at 1975 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting), or, as Madison 
thought, a “direct and incidental” connection to a constitutional end, Clark & Hall, 
supra, at 42.  Quite simply, the minimum-coverage requirement is directly nec-
essary to the efficacy of a comprehensive regulatory scheme otherwise within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.   
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has rejected the claim that “Necessary and 
Proper” legislation “can be no more than one step removed from a specifically 
enumerated power,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
1965-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the minimum-coverage require-
ment would meet even that test.  It is only one step removed because, without it, 
many of the Act’s direct regulations of insurance terms in interstate commerce 
would crater.  See pp. 26-28, supra.  While courts should not “‘pile inference upon 
inference’” to sustain congressional action under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
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Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment), no inference-piling is needed here.  Experience has shown that the 
non-discrimination requirements and prohibition against preexisting-condition 
exclusions—both proper exercises of core Commerce Clause powers—could not 
function effectively absent the minimum-coverage requirement.  In short, it is not 
“merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which Congress might 
have perceived an attenuated link between the powers underlying the [Act’s health-
insurance regulations] and the challenged [minimum-coverage] provision.”  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).  The “substantial 
link to Congress’ constitutional powers” is readily apparent.  Id. 
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause also obviates any activity/inactivity 
distinction.  “[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate 
commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).  There 
is no room in that standard for a distinction between compelling and prohibiting 
conduct.   
Historical practice makes clear, moreover, that “individual mandates” are an 
accepted, “necessary and proper” means of effectuating Congress’s express 
powers.  In the earliest days of the Republic, Congress discharged its authority to 
“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” U.S. Const. art. I, 
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§8, cl. 16, by compelling activity:  It mandated militiamen to obtain particular 
arms and supplies.  See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, §1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 
(requiring each person liable for service to “provide himself with a good musket or 
firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints,” and ammunition); id. §4, 1 
Stat. at 272-73 (horses and uniforms).  Congress has also prohibited inactivity by 
requiring people to respond truthfully to the census, 13 U.S.C. §221(a)-(b), report 
for jury duty, 28 U.S.C. §1866(g), and register for selective service, 50 App. 
U.S.C. §453.  Congress’s history of compelling conduct under a variety of 
enumerated powers forecloses any claim that the regulation of purported inactivity 
here is not a “proper” adjunct of its commerce power.  
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s judgment should be reversed. 
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